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As the Internet diffused throughout the 1990s, it touched a wide breadth of economic activities. 
The diffusion transformed the use of information technology throughout the economy. It led to 
improvements in products, lower prices, the development of new capabilities, and the development of 
many innovations that enabled productivity improvements among business users. It diffused to the 
majority of homes and businesses, altering the way people shop, research, play, and relate socially.   
The Internet began as a government sponsored operation in the 1970s and 1980s and grew into a 
commercial industry in the 1990s. At first, the Internet lacked market-oriented focusing devices and/or 
economic inducement mechanisms typically associated with directing efforts toward the most valuable 
innovative outcomes.
2 There were contracts for carrier services between government buyers and 
commercial suppliers, for example, but no general market orientation towards the pricing of the exchange 
of traffic between carriers. There also were a few providers of Internet equipment for government users, 
but no waves of inventive entrepreneurial entry. There were managers who understood the specific needs 
of their niche user communities, but no possibility for tailoring new products and services to every 
potential new set of users.  
How could an institutional setting that lacked market-orientation yield a set of innovations that 
supported the creation of massive market value only a few years later? This chapter helps explain the 
progression. The chapter divides the Internet’s development into a pre-commercial and commercial era. 
The pre-commercial period encompasses the 1970s and 1980s and some of the early 1990s, when the 
government controlled the research and development of the Internet and its components. The commercial 
period, which arose after the government opened control of the network to commercial interests, 
encompasses the mid-1990s and onward to present day. 
These two eras illustrate two distinct models for accumulating innovations over the long haul. 
The pre-commercial era illustrates the operation of several useful non-market institutional arrangements. 
It also illustrates a potential drawback to government sponsorship – in this instance, truncation of 
exploratory activity. The commercial era illustrates a rather different set of lessons. It highlights the 
extraordinary power of market-oriented and widely distributed investment and adoption, which illustrates 
the power of market experimentation to foster innovative activity. It also illustrates a few of the 
conditions necessary to unleash value creation from such accumulated lessons, such as standards 
development and competition, and nurturing legal and regulatory policies.  
[H1] The pre-commercial Internet under DARPA
3  
It may be tempting to compare the Internet to historically archetypical big inventions sponsored 
by government, such as the Manhattan and the Apollo projects. However, these archetypes for developing 
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technical breakthroughs are not good models for understanding what happened during the creation of the 
Internet. The Internet was not a single urgent project in a single lab devoted to engineering a single object. 
In fact, the early development of the Internet is rather less exciting than commonly assumed.  
The Internet began as a government sponsored project with a restricted set of users and uses. It 
occurred at a time when theory pointed in a few promising directions, but nobody, not even the experts, 
knew where implementation would lead. The project involved a vastly dispersed set of technically adept 
participants with a shared interest in the project, but otherwise heterogeneous needs and outlooks. The 
Internet developed slowly, and through a rather mundane process, accumulating capabilities over time 
from a vast number of contributors.  
The Internet’s early development fit into an archetype called “collective invention.” Collective 
invention is “a process in which improvements or experimental findings about a production process or 
tool are regularly shared.”
 4  There was no single user who demanded a technology such as the Internet, 
nor any single inventor for it. Rather, five partially overlapping groups played a role in shaping attributes 
that each valued, with an accumulation of innovative contributions over time. The first two groups were 
the primary decision makers at funding agencies: the Department of Defense and the National Science 
Foundation. The other three were programmers/inventors, administrators, and application users. Many 
were funded by the government agencies and given considerable discretion. Others became participants 
over time and added their own contributions within their own budgetary limitations.  
The U.S. military budget served as the first source of funds for the pre-commercial Internet, while 
the National Science Foundation largely served as the source of funds from 1986 to the end of 
government involvement in 1995. At a very basic level, the U.S. government paid for much of the 
research and development of the Internet during this period, and the government was the organization 
behind the early “demand” for the breakthrough technical achievements that became recognized as the 
Internet.  
This effort did not begin like a military procurement project, as if the Internet were a military 
rocket procured from several suppliers. In such a procurement process, a group of expert U.S. military 
personnel consider and deliberate at great length with great foresight about the needs of the government, 
and then they issue a set of specifications for a product or service with a pre-determined set of attributes. 
However, in the case of the Internet, the Department of Defense’s Department of Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA),
5 funded the core research and development work that led to the Internet – 
indeed, this work was but one of many DARPA projects on the frontiers of computer science.
6 The 
project first intended to build prototypes for a packet-switching data-communications network of 
networks, which pushed the boundaries of computing at the time. Both “packet-switching” and “a 
network of networks” were budding theoretic concepts. DARPA’s administrators wanted innovations in 
the form of ideas, new designs, and new software. The administrators also desired all of these innovations 
be portable to military operations in the long run, as required under the Mansfield Amendment 
(stipulating that Department of Defense funding be relevant to military’s mission). While the demand for 
these innovative solutions was quite general, the specifics were undetermined. The U.S. military faced 
issues with its own computing facilities and operations that justified the research and development 
expense, even though its own managers could not concretely describe the object that would result.
7 
The military sought a robust design for a communications network, and its potential value was 
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self-evident. Keeping communications functioning in spite of a blown/cut line, for example, has military 
value in hostile battlefield conditions. Packet switching held the promise to achieve this attribute by 
allowing data to flow along multiple paths, unlike a circuit-switched telephone network in which calls 
follow a pre-set path programmed into central office telephone switches. In principle, an inexpensive 
packet switching network could also cover vast geographic distances, which could support the sharing of 
expensive computing resources over such distances. That too had self-evident military value. For 
example, military users in many locations – even potentially dangerous locations – could access databases 
housed in another (potentially safer) location. 
An additional technical and pragmatic aspiration also played a role. An ideal network of networks 
could facilitate the movement of data between computer systems – mostly mainframes in this era – that 
otherwise could not interoperate seamlessly. A system that could enable the exchange of data and 
communication between computing systems without frequent human intervention would save the military 
time and personnel expenses, and help realize new strategic capabilities. Coordinating the exchange, 
combination, and filtering of data between computer systems generated numerous logistical and 
organizational problems for military operations that increasingly depended on computing.  
 Although these innovations later would be portable to non-defense uses, that was not among the 
relevant criteria for the program at the outset. Initially there was no explicit requirement that the 
innovation work with all (or even most) computer systems in non-military uses, though that was a likely 
byproduct, since non-military uses of computing overlapped in some applications and functionality with 
military uses. However, the program was informed by a general understanding that shaped all activities in 
information technology within DARPA: having a healthy U.S. information technology sector was a 
valuable military advantage in the long run.  
Eventually several prototypes for a packet switching network were engineered. With additional 
work, these innovative designs turned into a prototype of an operating network, operated by managers 
from Bolt Beranek and Newman (BBN), a research contractor that sub-contracted through DARPA. A 
number of researchers and their students became familiar with its design and operational principles. The 
network grew from there, covering more locations and more participants throughout the 1970s. The 
network extended into many research laboratories and universities with funding from DARPA.   
[H2] A skunk works and wild ducks 
From the outset when DARPA’s “packet switching” and “network of networks” project began, 
the desired attributes for the Internet represented a radical technological departure from existing practice. 
To understand the development of radical technologies within the military, it is best to begin with an 
understanding of two terms: a skunk works and wild ducks.  
A skunk works is an organizational home for frontier development projects.
8 It is housed away 
from the main operations of an organization, sometimes in secret or with organizational barriers, and 
often with top management support for these barriers. Typically the development projects involve 
something of value to the future of the organization but are not directly connected to its present 
operational or service missions. In this case, DARPA itself is the military’s skunk works. The mission of 
the agency is research oriented, not operational, although in the case of the Internet operational issues 
eventually became salient as well. Broadly construed, DARPA’s mission is to develop radical new 
concepts and operations to transform military operations through development of new technologies. The 
agency had been established after Sputnik, and it was deliberately not beholden to the short run 
operational needs of any of the armed services, although its innovations were required to eventually 
enhance some military function. 
Wild ducks are a particular group of technically adept and innovative contributors, often 
                                                            
8 The phrase originated from a project for the Air Force at a division of Lockheed Martin. The division 
had called itself the “Skonk Works” after a phrase from Al Capp’s Lil’ Abner cartoon – the skonk works 
was a “secret laboratory” that operated a backwoods still. The label became well known throughout the 
industry, in part because it was considered humorous and saucy. Lil’ Abner’s publisher eventually asked 
Lockheed Martin to change it, and “skunk works” emerged from there (Rich and Janus 1994). 3 
considered social outsiders by those controlling funding. Wild ducks can encompass a range of behaviors 
and social differences that are regarded as potentially disruptive and costly to the regular operations of an 
organization. The reverse also often holds – that is, wild ducks often regard the practices of those 
involved in regular operations as interfering with their inventive activity. During DARPA’s research into 
what became the Internet, the inventive individuals behind it were largely wild ducks.  
Wild ducks had been a colloquial term of art in computing for decades, coined by IBM CEO 
Thomas Watson, Sr. to describe the innovative practices of his technical team.
9 At IBM, wild ducks were 
avant-garde thinkers in their field, often chasing visions they saw as aesthetic. The value of their ideas 
could defy evaluation ex-ante, and in many cases, it was hard to evaluate even after a prototype was 
developed. However, to fully realize the innovative potential of wild ducks and allow them to coexist 
within a mainstream organization, IBM separated the wild ducks from others, which kept valuable 
inventions temporarily hidden, unthreatening to others in the business, and, therefore, flowing until 
needed.  IBM used wild ducks to develop innovative products and used the mainstream sales force to 
systematically and uniformly sell these products. IBM thereby kept control of the computing platform and 
ensured its commercial success by making sure it did not remain static. 
The wild ducks arrangement worked well for the Department of Defense. If the wild ducks failed 
to realize their grandest innovative vision, then almost nobody had to be bothered. If, on the other hand, 
the wild ducks invented something that others within the mainstream organization could appreciate and 
use, then the best scenario would be achieved. However, there was one troubling scenario: What would 
the mainstream organization do if the most valuable inventions could not be integrated into existing 
operations? In this case, the wild duck arrangement allowed the military to at least defer questions about a 
costly integration until the time when or if the innovation proved fruitful. If the need arose, then such 
knotty questions would have to be addressed, but not before then.  
As it turned out, a particularly inventive group of wild ducks in the pre-commercial Internet 
accumulated a range of inventions, eventually bringing about a large economic gain for participants. More 
to the point, these innovations, which comprised the basic building blocks for the Internet, turned out to 
have enormous value when transferred to non-participants. Some of these inventors were established 
university researcher, such as Paul Baran, Joseph Licklider, or Leonard Kleinrock, and their reputations 
would be further enhanced by their involvement in designing packet switching networks. Other 
researchers would become affiliated with the project right at the outset of their careers and remain 
involved throughout their careers. This included Steve and David Crocker, David Clark, John Postel, and 
Vint Cerf, among many others. The Internet Protocol Suite known as TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol and Internet Protocol) emerged from their efforts.
10 Their achievements would be recognized by 
contemporaries, and they gained reputations over time from those achievements.  
DARPA’s program for fostering innovations in computing departed from the archetype of a 
skunk works practiced among military contractors.
11 The continuity in DARPA’s managerial procedures 
and policies borrowed considerably from practices for R&D and military procurement, melding them into 
a goal-oriented research and development project administered by technically capable program officers 
executing a general vision. One key departure involved the amount of discretion given program officers. 
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Though they were reviewed eventually, in the short run many had freedom to make the decisions they 
thought would work best. Another principal departure involved geography. DARPA’s skunk works was 
not physically housed in a single organization in Washington, D.C. Instead, it was administered from 
D.C., but the work was geographically dispersed to many locations in research organizations and 
universities across the country. DARPA sent money for projects organized by key researchers, who 
maintained their laboratories at their own universities. Money was also sent to contracting research 
organizations, such as BBN (in Cambridge, MA), the Rand Corporation (in Santa Monica, CA), and 
Stanford Research Institute (in Menlo Park, CA). While DARPA provided funds to support labs, buy 
equipment, and pay graduate students at these locations, the government agency was able to take 
advantage of building on what was already there, both in terms of institutions and brainpower. 
Dispersed geography mattered in several other ways. Innovative improvements arose and 
accumulated in different places, yielding a variety of lessons and insights at a time when theory pointed in 
many directions and implementations were scarce. Collectively this program began accumulating 
improvements and suggestions from a diversity of sources, which were loosely coupled to one another 
through their common funding source and, non-trivially, shared scientific and engineering goals.  
Program officers encouraged this sharing through arranged face-to-face meetings and 
communications.
12 Despite the geographic dispersion, participants shared a sense of identity about the 
whole project, and they were encouraged to share innovations with one another. Inventors also were 
encouraged to pay close attention to how their meta-design facilitated inventive specialization across the 
entire program. In addition, participants developed norms for documentation to facilitate knowledge 
retention and improvements built on earlier advances. 
Unlike typical project management, program officers in this case did not initially rely on some of 
institutions typically affiliated with academic science, such as peer-review, formal proposals with 
multiple stages of review, and panels of reviewers. They did solicit research proposals on occasion, but 
not necessarily proposals promising specific incremental advances within short time horizons. Instead, the 
program officers often asked for short broad proposals, picked stars, made general agreements with them 
about the long term goals, funded their labs with uncommonly large amounts of money (for the discipline 
at the time), and gave them large amounts of discretion to pursue those goals in the manner they saw fit. 
In exchange for this funding, the researchers were required to attempt technically ambitious projects, 
participate in certain conferences, document and share their results with each other, and contribute to the 
training of a new generation of researchers, among other things.  
Large sums of money invested by DOD sustained continuity in its operation and continued 
improvement. The level of funding is notable because no program officer ever asked for concrete 
invention on a specific time frame, for example, and most of the inventors would have considered 
meeting such requirements to be pointless and absurd bureaucratic milestones. At the same time, many 
program officers were technically sophisticated enough to follow specific advanced developments. Some 
of them even contributed inventions to the efforts. In fact, DOD program officers often did the evaluation 
themselves or with a small set of consultations, and not necessarily using evaluation by peers. 
[H2] Nurturing useful prototypes 
Precisely because a skunk works seeks to break with established patterns to facilitate 
experimentation and protect it from the objections of other organizations or their parent entity, a skunk 
works faces numerous challenges meeting existing user needs. Its challenges are even greater when the 
participants in the skunk works create inventions for needs that most potential users have not yet even 
recognized. In the case of the DARPA Internet project, however, innovation and operations began to 
overlap. As a result, instead of meeting bureaucratic requirements, inventors were held to a different test: 
they had to eat what they grew. That is, their innovations were put into use comparatively quickly. The 
overlap between operations and invention played a key role in fostering useful innovations.  
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The first and second generation of Internet researchers
13 quickly became familiar with a second 
unusual feature of their skunk works: new ideas grew out of their own experiences and often stemmed 
from their own needs. Because inventers were also users, they were motivated to develop working 
prototypes into operational pieces that they and others could employ. Working prototypes were crude 
models of innovation in need of refined improvement. Often oriented towards demonstrating the proof of 
a new concept, these were deliberate interim manifestations of proposals, aimed to explore and, if 
possible, solve a piece of a problem and to help the inventors learn. Through their own use, many of these 
inventors became interested in issues that moved beyond simply illustrating a concept with their 
prototypes. They were introduced to issues associated with refining and maintaining workable versions of 
their inventions in a functioning and operational network—and not just any network, but a network they 
all used.  
In the short run, mixing inventive activities with operational activities had a very direct effect on 
orienting innovation. Although using a common network, each group of researchers began working in its 
own direction, with its own working prototypes, for its own use as well as use by others. Due to their 
common affiliation with DARPA and common use of the network (which became known as the 
DARPAnet), the researchers began to make their prototypes interoperate with each other. 
Many analysts of computing markets today stress the importance of a “killer application” – an 
application so compelling it justifies complementary investments. Early Internet innovators quickly 
developed several killer applications -- file transfer, (something close to what we today recognize as) 
instant messaging, and electronic communication that became electronic mail.
14 Arguably, electronic mail 
was not even the most central innovation of the skunk works, but it was one that every participant used. 
Its pragmatic value was widely recognized among participants. More than 50 people made important 
contributions to the standard e-mail design in the 1970s and 1980s, and by the end of the decade virtually 
all participants in the Internet made use of this design. Another lesson from the e-mail application 
innovation is that its usefulness was apparent at the time to the innovators but not to the sponsoring 
federal agency. As stated by Bob Kahn, DARPA “…would never have funded a computer network in 
order to facilitate e-mail” because other goals were more paramount, and person-to-person 
communication over telephones appeared sufficient.
15  
The spread of e-mail highlights the essential paradox of a skunk works: protecting wild ducks 
leads to long term benefits if the inventions get pointed in useful directions from an early stage. However, 
at an early stage virtually nobody in an organization except the most technically sophisticated is able to 
assess whether the wild ducks have succeeded in moving in a useful direction or in achieving even the 
most basic milestones!  
How did participants make such assessments then, particularly into the late 1970s, after the basic 
science was done but considerable room was left for implementing new improvements? The integration of 
innovations into immediate operation shaped the consensus about innovations and helped determine 
whether suggestions for new protocols merited attention. As improvements arose, those improvements 
became gradually embedded in routine processes. If installation administrators did not think the 
innovations useful, they did not get installed nor used. If they did get used, the inventions got refined and 
began to accumulate additional improvements.  
One additional aspect of this experience deserves attention: the DARPA skunk works was a 
technical meritocracy. In a technical meritocracy, individuals advance in standing through commonly 
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14 See Partridge (2008), Crocker (2008a) and the description in the Living Internet History sites 
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recognized technical achievements, rather than by external credentialing. The technical meritocracy for 
the Internet survived as an informal consensus process in the 1970s and much of the 1980s. The 
meritocracy survived for several reasons. First, virtually all participants came out of an academic and 
research background. They found it natural to work within a technical meritocracy, developing consensus 
about improvements worth keeping. Second, most of the program officers shared this research 
background, and they justified their actions on a similar basis. Third, in any given area the group of 
researchers and administrators tended to be small enough that a technical consensus could emerge 
comparatively quickly. Fourth, and crucially, the top managers in the Department of Defense protected 
DARPA against other influences on decision making, such as promotion of researchers or their projects 
using criteria other than a technical meritocracy. That is significant when compared to the alternatives: 
Promotion based on abject favoritism, outside political connections, seniority within university 
hierarchies, or fame acquired through prior accomplishments in other areas. 
Note, however, that this technical meritocracy was pragmatic in its orientation because innovation 
was put into use. If installation administrators did not find it useful, then the invention did not get used. If 
it did not get used, the invention did not get refined, or accumulate additional improvements.  
[H2] The Internet under the NSF 
The example of the DARPA Internet project contains lessons of certain behavior to avoid. First 
and foremost, the DOD restricted participation in the use of the results from the DARPAnet experiments. 
These restrictions truncated the range of uses to which the technology could be put by truncating the set 
of users who could experiment with it. DARPA’s administrators partially recognized this limitation, and 
eventually permitted its contractor BBN to spin off a division and start a packet-switching service in the 
early 1970s.
16 
The issue kept returning, however, in part because DARPA sponsored experiments that 
succeeded more than anticipated. By the end of the 1970s, the DARPANet was operational, and though 
far from perfect, the key pieces of the engineering insights had moved far beyond their status as working 
prototypes. It connected a network of research contractors and university researchers who wanted to 
continue to collaborate with each other. The inventions were portable to others, who could (and did) 
independently design and operate their own networks. In fact, frustrations with gaining access to the 
DARPAnet motivated some participants to start their own networks. For example, both Bitnet and CSNet 
began in the early 1980s, partly as a response to restricted access to DARPANet. Both of these spinoff 
networks provided the functionality that users desired, enabling them to move data between computers in 
different locations, supporting file sharing, and enabling electronic mail. Each had a different architecture 
and rules for participation, however. CSNet aspired to provide connectivity only to computer science 
departments, while Bitnet connected computing systems between various researchers and universities. A 
third network at the time was more informally organized, and went by the label, UUCPNet or Usenet, and 
involved numerous participants both from inside universities and outside.  
The increasing growth of alternative networks showed that such connectivity interested numerous 
participants other than the military.  The network had grown beyond the core concerns of the military. 
Eventually, more researchers wanted to participate than DARPA had an interest in supporting. DARPA 
also worried about compromising the security of its own network by allowing non-military users to 
participate.  
By the early 1980s, the limits of participation became a widely recognized source of tension. 
DARPA finally in 1985 handed over control of part of the network to the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) in order to open it to the many civilian researchers interested in using it.
17 By then the community 
of innovators had evolved into a loose confederation of researchers from many locations, so this 
administrative change partly ratified what had already begun to happen informally.  
Innovation under NSF funding differed in several respects from innovation under DAPRA 
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switching service. Eventually Telenet became part of the Sprint data network. 
17 These issues are described in great detail in Abbate (1999).  7 
funding. This is not surprising, because the missions of the two organizations differ. DARPA is part of 
the defense department, while the NSF supports civilian research. Just as with DARPA, no requirement 
about an immediate civilian application shaped activities other than a general understanding that the 
NSF’s needs could be met more easily and cheaply if the U.S. computing and communications industries 
remained healthy. And as with DARPA’s motivation, aspirations for resource sharing shaped NSF’s 
investment. Much investment was therefore aimed at packet switching and the creation of an electronic 
communication network among researchers. The packet switching would enable the movement of files 
between supercomputer centers and many universities. Supercomputers were expensive fixed investments 
with no geographic mobility. The NSF aimed to use the Internet to permit many researchers to connect 
with those supercomputers, making greater use of the capacity and sharing the huge computing power 
they embodied.  
Another aspiration for the NSF concerned a scaling issue that DARPA had not yet faced. The 
U.S. research community increasingly took to using the communication network for file sharing and 
electronic communication, and throughout this period traffic grew. The NSF aimed to build a routine and 
reliable network infrastructure, making it easy to adapt and spread to every place of higher learning in the 
United States – universities, community colleges, and research institutes.
18 Over time, the investment 
aimed to give a wide range of participants – students, faculty, and administrators – a taste for what the 
Internet could do to help them in their work, namely, transmit electronic communication, data files, news, 
and other types of messages over long distances. The goal required a system that would handle traffic of 
many orders of magnitudes greater than anything accomplished to that point.  
However, as with DARPA, NSF’s management also came with some restrictions on participation, 
thus perpetuating the limitations of experimentation – only users connected to civilian research 
institutions could make use of the NSFNET, not, for example, commercial interests (except those who 
supplied services to NSF). However, restrictions due to this “acceptable use policy” were less binding 
than they had been with DARPA, and for a few years NSF’s managerial control reduced many of the 
tensions in the research community over participation.
19 
The transfer to NSF had several more consequences. A new source of funding introduced a new 
budgetary process, a new outlook about the future, and new set of priorities for operations. In particular, 
NSF managed the backbone of the network, but gave discretion to many universities to modify their 
installations as they saw fit. NSF also differed from DARPA in its more relaxed approach to outsourcing 
equipment supplies, which had later consequences for transitioning from NSF administration into wide 
commercial use.  By the time the Internet was commercialized, the surrounding industry was already in 
place to meet the needs of the new commercial market. For example, by the early 1990s there already was 
an industry building routers consistent with widely employed software protocols.  
In the late 1980s, NSF presided over another seminal design choice–the switch to a routing 
protocol that allowed for more than one backbone.
20 Until the NSFNET came into existence, there was 
only one network and one backbone, and BBN operated it. The scale was limited, and, in contrast, NSF 
anticipated supporting a much large network. The NSFNET therefore introduced additional backbones 
and regional carriers. In due time, NSF worked with others to introduce routing protocols that no longer 
presumed NSF would be the sole manager for the backbone. This was the beginning of the technical 
design changes necessary for evolution to a commercial Internet with multiple commercial carriers. 
By the beginning of the transition to commercialization in the late 1980s, the Internet was a large-
scale and reliable data communications network with a well-documented code base upon which any 
                                                            
18 Frazier (1995), Leiner et al. (2003).  
19 The NSF’s ”acceptable use” policy restricted the use of the NSFNET to to any university research 
faculty, student, or institute that contributed to furthering the development of science in the United States. 
20 NSF switched from the routing protocol Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) and replaced it with Border 
Gate Protocol (BGP). The EGP protocol presumed a known pathway for connecting systems. BGP 
enables fully decentralized routing. To Internet veteran David Clark, making this change was one of the 
earliest technical signs of the pending arrival of commercial network and the retirement of NSFNET 
(Clark 2008).  8 
participant could build additional layers of applications. While no serious networking engineer thought 
the Internet’s technical capabilities had stopped evolving, insiders generally acknowledged that the 
research-oriented Internet had matured, moving beyond its “nuts and bolts” stage of development.
21 At 
that point, Steve Wolff, then director of the NSFNET, recognized that there was no technical reason why 
the government had to solely operate the Internet. He also asserted that private firms could provide 
services as efficiently, or more so, than government-managed entities or sub-contractors. He therefore 
initiated a long series of steps (with the full support of the NSF’s management) aimed at what would be a 
transfer of technology out of exclusive government management and use.  
Wolff’s decision in itself illustrates another extremely important lesson. When a technology 
reaches a point where private firms can commercialize it, the transfer does not necessarily happen on its 
own. It requires government managers who recognize this opportunity, and it may even require active 
nurturing from government officials, as it did in this case.  
In the case of the Internet, this transition was quite early in some sense and quite late in another. 
By the time it was turned over to commercial use, the Internet had acquired most of the attributes that 
would lead to the transformation of every part of information and communications markets around the 
world. However, because of the NSF’s “acceptable use” policy, there had been little experimentation with 
using the Internet for commerce. There also was little understanding about its cost structure outside of an 
academic environment. Few of the participants had incentives to fully explore how a wide range of inter-
firm procedures would accommodate pricing, such as how interconnected networks would settle 
payments for exchanging traffic.  
All in all, NSF’s managers invested in numerous innovations that contributed to easing the 
transition to commercial markets. However, the limited experience with a variety of users undermined the 
ability of Wolff and his managers, as well as managers elsewhere, to forecast the appeal of new 
applications aimed at new commercial users.  
[H2] The cost of innovation 
It would be historically inaccurate to presume the funding for basic research about the Internet 
arose out of cost and benefit calculation designed to accelerate the arrival of those economic gains. The 
cost of the Internet was not of interest to the government, especially at the outset. DARPA quite explicitly 
did not use economic rationales to fund projects. DARPA funded high risk projects that “dealt with the 
development of fundamental or enabling technologies with which to reach newly defined DOD 
objectives….When DARPA judged success, it applied technical rather economic measurement 
standards.”
22 Likewise, the NSF invested in developing Internet technologies to meet its agency mission, 
not with the intent of producing large economic gains.   
It is also not possible to perform a cost and benefit calculation with the benefit of hindsight. The 
total cost to the government of creating the Internet is difficult to ascertain. It is known that during NSF’s 
management (approximately 1985–1995) the agency invested $200 million dollars in Internet 
technology.
23  However, this figure does not include the DARPA funding that paid for most of the early 
invention in the 1970s and early 1980s. While DARPA’s financial commitment to what became the 
Internet was undoubtedly considerable, to my knowledge no historian of these events has made a precise 
estimate of its size.
24 In addition, the cost tally of the Internet is further complicated because both DARPA 
and the NSF relied on distributed investments–the agencies paid for investments in backbone facilities 
and facilities for data-exchange, but offered only minimal support for investing in installations at 
universities. Most universities invested heavily in their own computing facilities, paid for by university 
funds. 
                                                            
21 This is the phrase used by Mandelbaum and Manderbaum (1993). See also Leiner et al. (2003). 
22 Norberg et al. (1996). 
23 Leiner et al. (2003).  
24 The entire expenditure for the IPTO, the agency within DARPA that funded most of the Internet, did 
not exceed approximately $500 million over its entire existence (1963–1986), and the funding for what 
became the Internet was but one of many IPTO projects. (Norberg et al. 1996).  9 
The cost of the Internet would also include the substantial number of failures that were part of 
DARPA’s broad portfolio of investments in computing science more generally. For example, it would 
include DARPA funding for a range of computer science efforts that did not work out as well as planned, 
such as in artificial intelligence. It also does not include a range of other experiments in computer science 
that NSF paid for and from which the general community of researchers learned. 
The Internet also benefited from improvements in a wide range of computing equipment that 
would have occurred with or without government funding. Like any other IT-intensive activity, research 
on the Internet gained benefits from what was happening to all equipment based on advances in solid state 
circuitry. It was easier to make innovative gains when many of the other complementary inputs into the 
effort improved at the same time.  
In summary, the early Internet succeeded because of the mix of managerial wisdom, pragmatism, 
and technical meritocracy of those involved, and because those players kept their efforts trained on 
scientifically worthwhile projects. The federal institutions sustained those efforts over a long period of 
time, building a community of researchers invested in innovating and refining attributes of the network. It 
eventually accumulated many attributes that today we recognize as the Internet, and which today we 
recognize as valuable. None of this was easy, automatic, or necessarily inexpensive.  
 
[H1] The commercial Internet 
Once commercialized, the Internet was unlike any commercial communications network that 
came before it. While it still could be described as a packet-switching network for moving data between 
computing clients (as had been envisioned from its inception), this description does not fully describe the 
early commercial form the Internet. It accumulated more capabilities and functions as a range of firms 
began to use pieces of it to enhance services provided to paying customers. Over time, “the Internet” 
became a label for not only the Internet but also for all the applications that accumulated around the 
Internet, used pieces of the Internet, and commercialized new functions for the Internet. Together they 
delivered an impressive array of services to a wide range of users.  
Supply of the Internet did not simply create its own demand. Rather, after years of development, 
a few applications were built that provided compelling value for tens of millions of decision makers. The 
size of the Internet access economy in the US gives a sense of how big demand for the Internet became, 
once it started to commercialize. For example, the revenue associated with providing Internet access is 
one of the largest categories of revenue out of the value chain
25 for Internet services, and it grew quite 
large in only nine years (Table1). By 2006, total revenues reached $39 billion; that is extraordinary for a 
technology that had almost no commercial service providers prior to 1989.
26  
 
TABLE 1 Revenue for access markets ($ millions) 
                             
Year  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Dial-up  5499 8966 12345 13751 14093 14173 14081 12240 10983 
DSL   n.a. 228 1245 2822 4316 6954  10240  12034  15066 
Cable   138 274  903 2600 4117 7372 9435  11139  13156 
Wireless                 n.a.   668  1140  n.a. 
Source: Greenstein and McDevitt (2009). 
Note: n.a. = Not available. 
 
                                                            
25 A value chain is a set of interrelated activities that produce a final product for end users. 
26 The closest commercial precursor to the Internet existed in the bulletin board industry, which generated 
several hundred million dollars of revenue before the commercial Internet blossomed and replaced it. The 
sentence used 1989 as a marker because this is the year of entry for the first carriers for Internet traffic, 
PSINET and UUNET.   10 
These revenue levels are important to stress, because access fees generated most of the revenue 
during the first decade of the commercial Internet. A typical US household spent more than three-quarters 
of its online time at free and/or advertising-supported sites.
27 Although subscription-based services and 
advertising services started growing rapidly after 2003, the amount spent on access fees each year has far 
exceeded advertising revenue. For example, the $39 billion in access revenue in 2006 compared with $9.7 
billion in Web Search Portal revenue
28 (which includes advertising) and $12.8 billion in Internet 
Publishing and Broadcasting revenue, of which $2.9 is advertising revenue.
29 Advertising revenue is now 
growing at a more rapid pace than subscription and access fees, and it may exceed access revenue soon, 
but not as of this writing. 
Widely dispersed market decisions lie behind this revenue growth, shown by the diffusion of 
Internet access to U.S. households (Table 2).
30 Starting with fewer than 20 percent of households in 1997, 
the Internet diffused to more than 73.1 percent of households by 2006. Similar results obtain for the 
diffusion of the Internet to business.
31 
 
Table 2: Internet Access at US Households  
 
Year  1997 199 1999  200 200 200 200 200 200 2006 
Households
*  103. 104. 105.0 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.0 
Internet Adopters
*  19.1 27.2  35.5  44.0 53.8 56.7 59.5 66.0 73.3 81.8 
   Broadband
* n.a.  n.a.  0.9  3.2  9.6  13.0 18.5 27.5 41.1 47.0 
  Dial-up
* 19.1  27.2 34.5  40.8 44.2 43.7 41.0 38.5 32.2 34.7 
% adopters
**  18.6 26.2  33.8  41.5 50.2 52.5 54.6 60.0 66.0 73.1 
Source: Greenstein and McDevitt 2009. 
n.a.: Not Available. 
* Millions of Households 
** Percent of total households 
 
Straightforward economic factors determined these trends: dial-up became available first and 
diffused to more than half of U.S. households. Broadband emerged later as a higher quality and more 
expensive alternative, albeit one available in only a few places and from a limited set of providers. Over 
time, however, broadband became more reliable and more widely available, and as that happened, many 
households paid to upgrade their Internet service. 
                                                            
27 See Goldfarb (2004). This discussion follows norms at the US Census, as expressed in the Annual 
Service Survey. Most households devoted most of its Internet budget to access fees (largely for services 
provided by wi-fi hot spots, or dial-up, broadband, wireless carriers) as opposed to subscription fees for 
content (largely provided by services such as Lexus-Nexus, the New York Times archive or Wall Street 
Journal archive). AOL sought to blur the distinction between access and content with a “Walled Garden” 
strategy, and successfully did so for a few years with its dial-up service. Later it reduced the importance 
of its access fees, relying on advertising for most of its revenue. This distinction does not count electronic 
commerce revenue, namely, use of electronic channels to support purchase of a good (e.g., clothing) or 
what had been a non-digital good (e.g., music).  
28 See Table 3.0.1, Information Sector (NAICS 51), or 3.4.2, Web Search Portals (NAICS 518112), in the 
2007 Service Annual Survey, NAICS 51, Information, 
http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/services/sas/sas_data/sas51.htm, downloaded September, 2009. 
29 See Table 3.3.5, Internet Publishing and Broadcasting (NAICS 516) in the 2007 Service Annual 
Survey, NAICS 51, Information. There is negligible adverting listed for Internet Service Providers (other 
than Cable, Telephone or Wireless carriers) Table 3.4.1. See  
http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/services/sas/sas_data/sas51.htm, downloaded September, 2009. 
30 These data sources are described in more detail in Greenstein and McDevitt (2009). 
31 As measured by the CPS supplement and the Pew Survey of the Internet and American Life. See 
Forman et al. (2003a, 2003b). 11 
[H2] The Initial Wave of value creation 
A closer examination of the historical record shows that this market arose in distinct waves of 
entry and exit—the first wave of entry occurred after NSF opened the Internet to commercial users, 
coupled with the invention of the World Wide Web and the creation of the World Wide Web Consortium, 
which came into creation in 1994–1995. The World Wide Web, invented by Tim Berners-Lee, is an 
Internet application that links documents together through the use of hypertext and viewed by a web 
browser. The commercial browser began to diffuse in 1995, enabling new functionality and new 
businesses built around this new technology. The Web quickly became the software platform for many 
creations thereafter, motivating further experimentation and magnifying the potential for value creation 
from the first wave of entrants. 
The creation of the commercial browser caused a change of expectations about what was possible 
to do on the newly privatized Internet. The browser began as an academic project, but even that was 
sufficient to demonstrate an entirely new range of applications affiliated with linking various pages, 
displaying multi-media, and supporting a whole new interface for human-computing interactions. 
Participants expected an explosion of commercial activity by established firms, venture 
capitalists, Wall Street analysts, and entrepreneurs, and, indeed, an immense entrepreneurial response did 
occur, which extended across a broad array of activities and applications, media, travel, commercial 
transactions, communications, and so on. The wave was a market response to new opportunity. Many 
different market participants sought to figure out how to apply the new technology to improve services to 
users. Indeed, unrestricted and entrepreneurial markets applied and reapplied these technologies over and 
over again to a wide range of problems and new applications.  
During the wave of entry, new knowledge and lessons were shared at low cost.
32 Several distinct 
models emerged taking advantage of the demand for electronic services. One prominent model subsidized 
the delivery of text and other visual media with advertising. Many of the adherents to on-line news, 
entertainment, and other information-based commerce found this to be attractive. Another prominent 
model used the Internet for the delivery of a service, such as the creation of on-line retailers like Amazon 
and the addition of an online counterpart to other branded catalogue retailers. Other models included 
developing a subscription service (such as for the NYT crossword puzzle); organizing a place for buyer 
and seller to conduct a transaction, such as an auction, and charging a fee for the service; organizing a 
fee-based listing service, such as an on-line help-wanted listing; providing a fee-based matching service, 
such as for singles; and providing a location for aggregating information from users (e.g., blogs, 
recommendations, wikis), supported by advertising.
33 
The first generation of browser and Internet Service Providers diffused extraordinarily rapidly. 
For example, the fraction of US households on-line jumped from 18.6 percent in 1997 to 41.5 just three 
years later (Table 2). The fast uptake of several popular applications of the 1990s (e.g., Hotmail, ICQ, and 
Yahoo!) reinforced this rapid diffusion.  
 However, the late 1990s saw more entry than actual demand would support a few years later. 
And so a shake-out ensued, first affecting access providers in 2000 (popularly known as the “Telecom 
Meltdown”), and then eventually many on-line retailers (popularly known as the “dot-com crash”). 
Investment uncertainty after the events of September 11, 2001, magnified the downturn affiliated with 
this adjustment. Sellers with high debt and low revenue exited. This occurred at all levels of the value 
chain for Internet services, as well as infrastructure building.  
While the mass exit led to widespread losses for many entrepreneurs and investors in 
entrepreneurs, with the benefit of hindsight the pattern of boom and bust should not come as a surprise. 
                                                            
32 The primary cost to society were the “co-invention costs,” that is, the expenses incurred by suppliers 
and buyers in the pursuit of customizing the general purpose technology to the unique needs and 
idiosyncratic circumstances their market participants faced. These costs arose for users trying to apply the 
technology and suppliers trying to sell it. For a discussion of co-invention, see Bresnahan and Greenstein 
(1997). 
33 For a summary of the diversity of models, see Hanson (2008) and Hirsch and Goldfarb (2008). 12 
Much of the activity was exploratory in nature, and, by design, some explorations fail while others 
succeed. Moreover, historians of technology had described investment booms and busts for other episodes 
of technological innovations and commercialization, such as followed the growth of the railroads, the 
growth of the steel industry, the growth of the automobile industry, the growth of electrical power, and so 
on. Finally, computing markets also had experienced boom and busts during the development and 
deployment of the personal computer, the minicomputer, and client-server systems, albeit at the smaller 
scale than what followed the commercialization of the Internet.  
The drama of the decline obscured another trend, how the first wave of experiments in value 
creation left a changed economic landscape. A large array of on-line activities survived, including large 
providers (e.g., AOL, Yahoo!, E-Bay, Google), as well as a wide array of niche products and services, as 
well as productivity enhancements. Many catalogue retailers successfully transitioned into on-line 
retailers, such as Victoria’s Secret, and LLBean, and thrived just fine with their existing brand names and 
efficient order fulfillment. In short, even with excess entry, markets have a way of rapidly creating 
thriving businesses that take advantage of the opportunities enabled by the new technology. The results 
are hard to foresee until supply, demand, and prices plays itself out in all its glorious unpredictability. 
[H2] Accumulating innovation in the Internet
34 
Accumulation of innovation in a market setting differs substantially from that in a skunk works. 
In a market setting, there are common signs of healthy innovative behavior, even in a quickly evolving 
industry such as the Internet, and these underpin value creation by many participants. Commercial 
behaviour resides inside a complex value chain. No single firm controls the value chain. The quality, 
price, and user experience arise from the interactions between participants in the value chain.  
Even when there is no agreement about which criteria observers should use to assess the 
performance of the commercial Internet, there are patterns of healthy conduct, that is, commercial 
behavior indicative of an innovative industry. Such healthy behavior correlates with desirable market-
wide outcomes, such as improvement in products, lower prices, new capabilities, or other innovations that 
lead to productivity improvements among business users. 
Three general features of the market foster accumulation of innovation from value creating 
activities. These are economic experimentation, entrepreneurial initiative, and vigorous standards 
competition. Economic experimentation is a market-oriented action designed to help a firm learn or 
resolve uncertainty about an unknown economic factor. Usually such lessons cannot be learned in a 
laboratory or controlled environment, either because they involve learning about the nuances of market 
demand or learning about sets of procedures for providing new services at a lower cost.
35 
Not all economic experiments come with the same orientation or learning goal. Some focus on 
learning about the profitability of incremental changes in business processes. Some seek to learn about the 
restructuring of organizations and the profitability that may result from the simultaneous alteration of 
many processes. Some even seek to learn about the profitability of restructuring the relationship among 
many organizations within an industry.  
Internet markets have been full of economic experiments in the last 15 years. That was especially 
so in the latter part of the 1990s, when firms took a wide variety of bets to learn about unknown aspects of 
customer demand and the costs for meeting them using Web technologies, such as the browser, server 
software to support it, and a range of other innovations. These experiments covered all parts of the value 
chain for delivering services—Internet access, client-server platforms, contracting among business 
partners, and so on. Carriers conducted them and so did content providers.
36  
Entrepreneurial initiatives involve an organization in a risky and challenging business in pursuit 
                                                            
34 Much of this section and the next provide a synopsis of arguments in Greenstein (2009c). 
35 Economic experiments pertain to any market experience that alters knowledge about the market value 
of a good or service (Rosenberg 1994; Stern 2005). Firms engage in economic experiments to reduce 
uncertainties about market value. 
36 See Greenstein (2008a) for an examination of the role of economic experiments in the evolution of 
Internet access.  13 
of a new economic opportunity. These firms are the market “participants” that make the first brave 
attempts at deploying, distributing, or servicing a new good to a wide range of customers. Small start-ups 
take entrepreneurial action and so do large firms. Sometimes small businesses that take such risks are 
bought by large organizations. Sometimes small start-ups go public and grow into large firms themselves. 
The increasing presence of entrepreneurs in communications markets has brought rapid change to many 
sub-markets.  
Yet, entrepreneurial activity can increase and decrease for distinct reasons. Experimentation and 
competition between leads to innovative entrants, or it may enhance the products of one particular firm. It 
forces incumbents to react, or, even better yet, anticipate the entrant and innovate in advance. This fosters 
incentives to lower prices and sponsor more innovative products, and sooner. Users benefit from all of 
those. 
Vigorous standards competition also played a role in innovation in the Internet. That is because 
leading-edge technologies often cannot deploy on a wide scale without some routines or processes, and/or 
coordination of activities across many firms. Thus, the ratification of new standards generally acts as a 
leading indicator of impending technological progress and serves as another sign of a healthy innovative 
industry. While new standards and upgrades to existing standards may not arrive at a regular rate, a slow 
pace for development or a slow arrival of new standards usually sets off alarms. 
To be sure, this benchmark is particularly challenging to put into practice, because some 
standards are more important than others. The Internet Protocol Suite known as TCP/IP (Transmission 
Control Protocol and Internet Protocol) have played a central role for decades, for example, and any 
alteration to them receives considerable attention, deservedly more attention than other standards. The 
same is true for protocols that govern the World Wide Web, which are handled at the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C). This is also so for important components of the Internet, such as upgrades to wire-
line Ethernet. That topic is discussed at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
Standards Association committees assigned to new standards. In the case of wire-line Ethernet, for 
example, it tends to be sub-committees of the Working Group for Wireless Local Area Network 
Standards.  
Standards design needs competition. Although the process of standards design in which market 
competition has played a role can be a messy, frustrating, and confusing process, this mess is necessary.  
Standards designed in the absence of competition usually have been orderly, infrequent, and simplified. 
Such standards have been more likely to lead an industry down as unhealthy an innovative path as it can 
go. 
If a firm with market power designs a new standard, it will face strong incentives to roll it out 
slowly to protect the firm from cannibalizing its own monopoly rents. For example, in the days when 
IBM controlled a large part of the mainframe market it could not bring itself to abandon Extended Binary 
Coded Decimal Interchange Code (EBCDIC), its standardized proprietary language, or, for that matter, to 
help others migrate up from EBCDIC to the many other superior languages available. Despite plenty of 
improvements IBM could have made, its managers refused to deploy them, preferring instead to exploit 
locked-in users.
37  
Monopolies also face strong incentives to have a “quiet life,” to paraphrase Sir John Hicks.
38 That 
is, monopolies may exert less effort when they choose standards, or design them to castrate user choices 
in such a way that leads to less inconvenience for the monopolist at the expense of the user (e.g., 
trimming product line breadth, or trimming away complex attributes of the product). For example, until 
the mid-1970s, AT&T held a monopoly over residential customer telephone handsets. Most households 
faced a limited menu of (over-engineered and excessively rigid) choices. Well engineered or not, there 
were too few choices in comparison with what a competitive market would have done.  
                                                            
37 Brock (1975). 
38 “…People in monopolistic positions…are likely to exploit their advantage much more by not bothering 
to get very near the position of maximum profit, than by straining themselves to get very close to it. The 
best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.” Hicks (1935). 14 
With the breakup of AT&T’s monopoly, multiple providers began to match the offerings of its 
nearest rivals. In a short time, the heated and urgent competitive behavior familiar to consumer 
electronics eventually overtook the market, leading to a plethora of choices at a wide range of prices. In 
other words, in the absence of restraining limitations on discretion, monopolies have designed selfish 
standards. An antidote to the selfish standards of monopolies has been competition between standards. In 
the history of the Internet, massive entrepreneurial entry drove innovation, and accessible standards 
contributed to it. 
[H2] Negotiations between open and proprietary standards 
One feature of the competitive Internet is probably the most crucial for accumulating innovation 
from dispersed market participants. Not surprisingly, it is the most controversial. Negotiations over 
interdependent processes shaped how the market accumulated services and built on each other. These 
negotiations took on importance because every participant, the innovative and not so innovative, operated 
within a system of technically interrelated components and services, where these processes interoperated. 
The failure or reduction in performance of any of these activities could lead to degradation of the quality 
of outcomes for many users.   
In a network with a high degree of technical interrelatedness, there are general gains to all parties 
from bringing routines into business processes and activities, much like there are gains to adopting 
standards and platforms to coordinate activities. While there may be no better way to reduce complexity, 
adopting such routines may require negotiation between multiple parties. For example, even the simplest 
of activities, such as sending e-mail, involves many participants, and efficient delivery of services 
depends on advanced agreement about how their business activities will interrelate.  
To reduce the uncertainty about how such services interoperate, commercial firms take one of 
two approaches, either they negotiate arrangements (contractual norms) in advance with all relevant 
participants, or they do it all themselves by offering a platform (a bundle of standards) that accomplishes 
the same task, internalizing the contracts within one firm’s decision making.  
Although the inception of the early internet was a “network of networks,” today leading firms and 
their business partners view the commercial Internet as a “network of platforms.” This seemingly small 
change in definition is far from insignificant. The rise of a plethora of platforms on the Internet is a source 
of both celebration and consternation. Platforms perform functions that firms and/or users value. Their 
presence usually suggests that some firms/users are better off with them than without, and it usually 
suggests they have replaced an inadequate non-proprietary standard inherited from the era prior to 
commercialization. At the same time, large or dominant platform leaders usually possess market power, 
and that occasionally gives them the ability to resist non-proprietary standards that serve the interests of 
some rivals.  
Which is better, proprietary or open? Such debates inevitably boil down to restrictions on the 
discretion of incumbent management to determine standards. Proprietary and open standards contrast 
most sharply in their respective approaches to transparency and participation.  
With standard proprietary platforms, leading firms retained discretion and guided participation 
within strict rules. Generally, strong platform leaders, such as IBM, Microsoft, and Intel, retained their 
authority by owning assets on which others depended, and by not being transparent about how such assets 
would change in the near future. Such practices came into direct conflict with the transparent and 
participatory processes for standards development in the Internet, particularly as practiced at the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), which used these processes to support group decision making.
39  
Conversely, transparent processes are those in which decision makers alert participants to 
imminent change—sometimes well in advance—when their change will diminish the returns on others’ 
innovative investments. In many Internet standards forums, such as the IETF, the organizations take 
                                                            
39 These trade-offs are discussed at length in Greenstein (2009b), which contrasts the operations of the 
Microsoft, as it developed Windows 95, with the operations of the IETF, as it operated when the 
privatization of the Internet first began.  15 
considerable effort to remain transparent and embed such norms in the operations of the group.
40 Such 
transparency is one of the reasons why standards processes have become a strong indicator of the 
imminent release of leading-edge technologies in Internet equipment. Interested parties monitor the 
designs (because they can attend IETF meetings) and know that their near rivals do the same (because the 
data are available to anyone). All parties plan to match each other along the dimension of the standard and 
differentiate along the dimensions in which each has competitive advantage. Competition ensues once the 
standard is upgraded from its Beta to an endorsed and official standard. 
Transparency is also a feature found frequently in open source projects with importance to the 
Internet value chain, such as Linux, Apache, Firefox, and the W3C. In the experience of Internet 
networks, a minimal level of transparency has been a necessary element of an open value chain operating 
for a large number of users. Defining such minimal levels is an important economic issue if other firms 
will not make long-term investments unless they understand at a fine level of detail how their software 
must interact with another’s. 
Transparency is distinct from participatory rules.
41 Participatory processes are those in which 
sponsoring organizations invite comment, discussion, and input from others affected by their actions. 
Such organizations solicit input through public forums, e-mail lists, blogs, community sites, and a range 
of other activities. Standards organizations vary considerably in their policies for encouraging or 
discouraging participation. Some organizations charge fees, some require participants to meet certain 
technical qualifications, and others allow any observer to attend but not vote. For example, the 
organization that designed and updates Wi-Fi does not allow unrestricted participation; firms must pay a 
fee in order to send representatives.  
Wide participation is found quite frequently in open source projects, particularly those without 
sponsorship. Often technical skill determines participation. For example, the Firefox browser community 
has quite diverse participation from numerous corners, though participants tend to self-select on the basis 
of technical skill simply because they would be lost otherwise. Similar observations hold for Linux and 
Apache. In both examples, most participants are quite technically skilled, and in the latter case such skill 
acts as an explicit qualification. Wikipedia is perhaps the best-known example of an online project that 
encourages wide participation from a community of contributors, and where no skill test is applied to 
contributors. 
Wide participation is probably the least common attribute among standards consortia sponsored 
by commercial firms. Most managers prefer to retain decision making authority, guarding investment 
decisions in the name of stockholders. There is concern that giving up such discretion risks having 
participants take investment in directions that do not serve firm interests.
42 In addition, accommodating 
wide participation normally comes at a cost, such as slower decision making and more onerous 
managerial challenges in coming to consensus. Hence, even some ostensibly open standards processes 
chose to restrict participation. For example, Tim Berners-Lee established the W3C with a less 
participatory structure than found in the IETF, where he had personally experienced the drawbacks of 
slow decision making when he first tried to standardize the core inventions behind the World Wide 
Web.
43 
Although the Internet experience does not give precise directions towards the best choice for 
participation rules, in the past, wider participation has tended to beat out no participation. Thus, every 
proprietary platform adopts some degree and form of participation (though, to be sure, with varying 
degrees of transparency). Perhaps the biggest surprise from the Internet experience is the persistence of 
standards-making institutions with wide participation and transparent processes. Once established, these 
institutions have persisted, co-existing alongside proprietary platforms, sometimes as competitors and 
sometimes as complements. Firms have learned to live with these institutions, and many firms have 
learned to thrive alongside them. Cisco, Intel, IBM and many Wi-Fi firms are active participants in these 
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standards forums. Even (previously reluctant) firms such as Microsoft, AT&T, and Verizon have found it 
useful to participate and fund such activities.  
These institutions guided the accumulation of innovations in a market setting. Successful 
platforms accumulate additional functionality over time. Leaders of platforms with proprietary interests 
attempt to grow the functionality for their platform, as well as direct the gains from growth to their own 
firms. Information sharing and flow between participants is an instrument in achieving those goals. In 
contrast, in non-proprietary settings the accumulation of innovation differs because the information 
accumulates in organizations that foster transparency, and, often, do not place restrictions on the use of 
the information. During the initial growth of the commercial Internet both types of organizational forms – 
as sponsored by Microsoft in Windows95 or the World Wide Web Consortium, for example– had 
successful innovative experiences. Both nurtured big innovative pushes, accumulation of incremental 




[H1] Policy and Governance 
Direct government support for R&D in the creation of the Internet had two potential effects. It 
accelerated the arrival of the technology, and it influenced its direction. During the pre-commercial era of 
the Internet, the creation of a general purpose technology for exchanging packets of data between many 
firms was risky. It had no immediate obvious commercial payoff. DARPA’s program officers intended to 
fund radical technological progress that otherwise would not have been funded by private firms. They 
intended to develop research communities in those areas where almost none had existed. The investment 
aimed to develop fundamental scientific understanding and engineering experience, accelerating the 
arrival of actual products and services at some point. DARPA accomplished its goals and then some. 
Long before the Internet arrived in particular, packet switching was but a theoretical idea and expensive 
to implement. There is no doubt the initial work funded by DARPA in the 1970s accelerated the arrival of 
the technology. No other private firm at the time, such as IBM or AT&T, had projects in the area coming 
close to DARPA’s efforts in size and scope.
45  
DARPA also funded the building of research prototypes and the building of a prototypical 
system. Arguably that went beyond the aspirations of the DOD, but was an immediate byproduct of the 
project’s success, and a natural extension in terms of extending the scientific/engineering frontier. It had 
enormous value too, demonstrating the feasibility of what had been a theoretical idea.  
In an industry where many potential future technologies vie for attention, there was value in 
demonstrating that one of these forecasts was viable. In this case, DARPANet, and later NSFNET, 
showed that the successful operation of the entire system could have great value. This illustrates how 
demonstrations can serve as a focal point for further development, particularly in the face of widespread 
industry resistance prior to such demonstration.  
However, government funding came with a drawback. Restrictions on participants and 
“acceptable use” truncated experimentation and entrepreneurial initiatives. This truncation was a 
detriment to understanding the potential for the network outside of the limited uses to which DARPA’s 
community put it. 
The government’s role differed in the later time period, particularly the era just prior to the 
blossoming of the commercial Internet. In the private sector by the late 1980s, most savvy commercial 
observers anticipated the arrival of mass market electronic commerce, but few anticipated that the Internet 
would be it, and, for related reasons, few guessed that any would arrive as soon as did the Internet.  
Moreover, many private firms largely ignored the Internet. That fact colors any interpretation of 
the government’s role. Why did many private firms ignore investing heavily in the Internet? The 
skepticism at many corporations can be interpreted in three (overlapping) ways:  
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  a misunderstanding of the potential for the Internet, perhaps due to the 
commitment to an alternative technological vision or forecast;  
  a situation in which the technology lacked internal “champions” inside leading 
organizations, perhaps because of the expectation that it would cannibalize too many 
revenue streams at existing business;  
  a situation in which a technology benefited many users at once, perhaps because 
no single firm had incentive to nurture adoption that seemingly did not directly contribute 
to their own bottom line.  
For example, neither AT&T’s management nor that at any of the “baby Bells” expressed any 
strategic interest in commercializing services related to TCP/IP in the late 1980s. Most preferred to invest 
in services such as the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN),
46 which the managers considered the 
technical direction worth exploring.  
To be fair to AT&T’s managers, they were not alone. For example, despite employing some of 
the best researchers in the world on this topic and despite the involvement of its research division in the 
NSFNET, IBM’s strategic planning at the corporate level also ignored the Internet. The company did not 
aggressively commercialize related services. Instead, its corporate plans called for commercializing a 
proprietary set of networking technologies, built around its Systems Network Architecture (SNA). These 
plans ultimately led to some of the most high-profile product development failures in IBM’s history.
47 
Likewise, Digital Equipment Corporation, then the second largest computer company in the world, was 
strongly committed to DECNet, a proprietary network service.  
Even many sponsors of the NSFNET ignored its commercial potential. Most of the carriers were 
holdovers from the NSF, such MCI and Sprint and BBN’s division. Only a few other participants from 
the NSF era took entrepreneurial actions aimed at the commercial market, such as the managers who 
started carriers PSINet and UUNet, who entered in 1989, far before many others. Only a few bulletin 
board providers, such as Prodigy and CompuServe, made early switches to the Internet.
48 For example, 
none of the other mid-level carriers made a switch to for-profit status until after the NSF 
commercialization neared completion in 1994—five years later. As it turned out, AT&T did not start to 
offer Internet service until 1995, which is about the same time as many other mainstream firms. First it 
offered service to business and then to homes a year later. It continued to do well with business users, as 
well as briefly with home users before it faded later in competition with AOL. The mid-level networks 
started to convert to for-profit status about the same time. Most of the baby bells were even later than that.   
  
[H2] Shaping direction   
The rise of the Internet shaped the direction of technical change. The changes contained two 
attributes: first, the network was comprised largely of non-proprietary features/protocols/standards 
coupled with an open organization to support existing standards and update them (e.g., the IETF and 
W3C). Its existence was unexpected, in part because its leadership structure differed from every other 
alternative considered plausible by contemporary executives – such as a network dominated by any 
established firm (e.g., IBM), carrier (e.g., AT&T), equipment manufacturer (e.g., Lucent), quasi-
government agency (e.g., the ITU), or industry consortium (e.g., ISO). 
 For example, although many firms had e-mail services for their own computer networks, none of 
them had incentives to combine their systems with others’. No single firm had incentives to aggregate 
innovative suggestions from a vast array of contributors at the early and risky stage of developments. The 
Internet’s non-proprietary features acted as an attribute around which many participants could agree 
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because none of them individually risked too much nor benefited too much.  
Coupled with the open and non-proprietary nature of the Internet was a surprising set of 
technological leaders. Although government support made no difference to the stature of early innovators 
like Paul Baran, Joseph Licklider, or Leonard Kleinrock, whose reputations would have been high with or 
without DARPA’s projects, that was not true for the first generation of Internet developers, such as Steve 
Crocker or Vint Cerf. They often expressed surprise at the discretion they had, many of them becoming 
leaders as graduate students. Their historical recollections refer to many moments when they wondered 
when they would be displaced by “a professional crew,” that is, more senior researchers in the field of 
computer science.
49  
Perhaps the biggest change in direction came from the structure of governance that came along 
with the Internet. The IETF and W3C, among others, were open processes, in the sense that they fully 
documented their activities, did not restrict participation, and never actively sought to exclude any 
innovator from building applications on to the installed base of accumulated protocols.  
Not all aspects of that open structure were important.
50 For example, plenty of industry 
experience suggested that commercial organizations producing proprietary hardware and software designs 
could be as innovative as open communities. Sometimes open communities have been more innovative 
and sometimes proprietary firms have been, and both have co-existed. Rather, open institutions had two 
key structural features: not withholding information and not restricting its use. These features enabled the 
World Wide Web to commercialize so quickly. More pointedly, the IETF’s leadership was unwilling to 
withhold information from anyone, effectively not excluding outsiders, such as Tim Berners-Lee at the 
time, even though his inventions potentially displaced so many established processes and existing 
technologies, even technologies supported by the IETF.
51 Once the World Wide Web began to diffuse, no 
established firm could stop others from building on it and bringing about a massive change in many 
aspects of economic activity.  
[H2] Governance of the rules of the game 
Experience in this industry highlights the importance of good governance – simply spending 
federal R&D money or adopting policies from a check list, by itself, would not have been sufficient to 
achieve success. Rather, successful public support for innovation has been embedded in an institutional 
structure that provided checks and balances, counterbalancing the risk of any effort from degenerating 
into pork barrel spending and into coddling of existing incumbents. Creating this kind of system has 
required time, judgment, and (sometimes) strong political will. 
During the Internet’s pre-commercial era, many issues required sound judgments by public 
servants who were focused on executing a vision of what they thought would benefit the technological 
development of the Internet. Indeed, a crucial feature of DARPA’s success resided in stating a clear 
mission for its effort.
52 Another involved choosing managers with extraordinary intelligence and 
competence, giving them funds and discretion, and allowing them to work with minimal oversight.
53 
                                                            
49 Crocker (1987).  
50 This argument is developed more fully in Greenstein (2009b). 
51 Even though the vast majority of participants inside the IETF viewed Tim Berners-Lee’s proposal with 
indifference or hostility, all were perfectly willing to let him use all of the IETF’s tools. Berners-Lee, 
thus, built on top of existing IETF approved protocols with full freedom and discretion. Thus, he was able 
to take action quickly. See Berners-Lee and Fischetti (1999). 
52 Licklider’s three criteria for funding research still sound prescient today: “1. The research must be 
excellent research as evaluated from a scientific or technical point of view; 2. The research must offer a 
good prospect of solving problems that are of interest to the Department of Defense; 3. The various 
sponsored efforts must fit together into one or more coherent programs that will provide a mechanism, not 
only for execution of the research, but also for bringing to bear upon the operations in the Defense 
Department the applicable results of the research and knowledge and methods that have been developed 
in the fields in which the research is carried out” Norberg et al. (1996). See also Waldrop (2001) for a 
wider discussion.  
53 Norberg et al. (1996). 19 
Managers played a crucial role at both DARPA and NSF, but they did not act alone. They had support 
from their direct supervisors and their co-workers, all of whom could articulate their general mission and 
understand how that translated into short purposeful managerial action. The pre-commercial era of the 
Internet also received political support from those in the defense department committed to DARPA’s 
autonomy.
54 Political actors did not intervene in the research involved in the Internet, although the 
Mansfield Amendment did influence a number of other related projects funded by DARPA. Political 
management also supported NSF’s stewardship and beyond (e.g., support from Senator Al Gore and 
Congressman Rick Boucher).
55   
During the commercial era, government played a role in setting the “rules of the game” by 
shaping negotiations among participants. In particular, legal questions covering intellectual property, 
monopoly powers, and other limitations and protections have shaped the Internet landscape. Market 
actors are sensitive to persistent and unresolved legal uncertainty over liability, ownership, and other legal 
rules that shape returns on investment. Hence, crucial parts of the value chain for the Internet have stalled 
as participants awaited legal or regulatory rulings settling boundaries.
56 Recently, for example, You-Tube 
was founded in an era when there were multiple plausible definitions for the precise legal safe-harbor for 
including copy-righted material on a web site for user-supplied video. These definitions today still remain 
ambiguous. Google acquired You-Tube in spite of the shadow of the legal risk, and its investments (worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars) will most likely change as court decisions change. 
After the retirement of the NSFNET and during the massive investments in the commercial 
Internet, it was fashionable to claim that the government’s role was minimal in fostering innovative 
incentives. Such a claim is fatuous at best.  Government actors were involved in determining rules for and 
resolving disputes about the minimal technical requirements telephone companies had to follow when 
interconnecting with a dial-up Internet Service Provider, and these were crucial for fostering the 
development of the early industry. Government actors also required a divestiture of assets as a condition 
for merger when WorldCom sought to merge with MCI, thus thwarting aspirations to assemble a large 
fraction of the Internet’s backbone under one organization. And, perhaps better known, government actors 
were involved in a wide array of issues that arose around Microsoft’s behavior during the browser wars.  
Such debates quickly reached back into the institutions that governed standards for the Internet. 
For example, legal precedents were set at a wide array of government organizations with jurisdiction over 
these disputes, such as at the Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Communications 
Commission in the United States, and at equivalent European Union Regulatory bodies.  
The policies that have resulted from legal battles have been a source of regulatory tension and 
friction. For example, established regulations, known as Computer II, compelled the U.S. phone industry 
to accommodate the new Internet Service Provider (ISP) industry. Managers in the existing telephone 
firms did not want to accommodate dial-up ISPs, but did so at first because Computer II required it of 
them.  
But policies such as Computer II were not there to support the Internet. Rather, they were the 
outgrowth of two long-standing principles: (1) common carrier regulation for telephones, which 
prevented the telephone company from being selective about who they served; and (2) antitrust 
regulations, which had led to the divestiture of AT&T, and, more importantly, to a series of regulations 
for governing carrier interactions with others, such as equipment firms, and providers of services over 
telephone lines, such as Bulletin Board providers.
57 Because of these legal actions, the United States had a 
less hostile approach to entrepreneurial entry of dial-up ISPs than did most of the world for reasons 
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unrelated to the Internet in particular.  
The United States also had a very nurturing legal regime for consortia and standard-setting 
bodies. At crucial moments these policies fostered a healthy dose of vigorous standards competition. 
Once again, these policies existed for their own reasons, and not because any policymaker was trying to 
encourage the Internet in particular. For example, such laws played a crucial role in Tim Berners-Lee’s 
personal decision making. In the United States, he received a much more welcoming set of conditions 
than those he faced in Switzerland, motivating him to leave employment at CERN and establish the W3C 
at MIT.  
 
[H1] Finally, why the Internet worked 
The history of the Internet highlights two distinct ways of organizing a long term program for 
accumulating innovation in a complex interdependent system. One approach relies on autonomous 
research institutions (skunk works) to organize and nurture inventive employees (wild ducks). The other 
approach relies on commercial markets to aggregate dispersed initiatives from a wide array of 
entrepreneurial participants.  
A skunk works faces a significant danger of innovating into areas where there is no demand, and, 
thus, no economic value. How did the pre-commercial Internet create value in spite of the absence of 
commercial demand? First, it avoided some dangers by keeping prototype and operations sufficiently 
close to one another. The first participants in the non-commercial Internet assessed value from their own 
experiences, and DARPA managers nurtured and permitted experimentation to blossom. That helped 
them create useful and innovative applications such as e-mail and packet switching. The DARPA skunk 
works worked within community norms that fostered accumulating technologies on the merits, avoiding 
technical dead ends. In addition, DARPA and the NSF played a pivotal role in becoming the element of 
“demand” for which innovation was supplied. The agencies’ substantial funding to research institutions 
(as well as leveraged funds through distributed investments to universities) procured the innovation for 
what became the breakthrough technologies leading to today’s Internet. This investment was not easy, 
automatic, or inexpensive, but many would argue it has been one of the most important innovative 
undertakings supported by the U.S. government. 
On the other hand, the skunk works approach restricted participation and truncated 
experimentation by excluding innovation along lines that did not support the “acceptable use” 
requirements of the government agencies. Such restrictions limited learning to an artificially narrow range 
of issues, and left a wide array of other applications untouched 
In contrast, the commercial era of the Internet played to the strength of market-based innovation. 
It permitted decentralized exploration from commercial firms facing a wide array of incentives and a wide 
variety of idiosyncratic circumstances. Market-oriented exploration did a marvelous job of exploring the 
range of uncertain factors affiliated with satisfying demand, thus demonstrating the benefits of conducting 
many economic experiments. Once released to commercial interests, the Internet became the springboard 
for a dizzying array of applications that were not envisioned by the sponsoring government agencies. 
These applications, particularly the World Wide Web and its associated browsing technology, quickly 
infiltrated nearly every aspect of U.S. business and domestic life, and their effect continues to grow.  
However, these explorations came to fruition because they were built upon a backbone 
technology that no single player or group of players in the market was willing or able to undertake—or 
for that matter, were forward-thinking enough to even visualize it. Throughout the history of the Internet, 
standards, protocols, and other rules of governance have shaped the direction and rate of innovations 
emerging from it. Some of these guiding factors grew with the project, most notably standards such as 
TCP/IP and protocols that govern the World Wide Web, as well as standard-setting bodies such as the 
W3C and IEEE. Other influential forces were not specific to the Internet but shaped it markedly, such as 
Computer II and legal rulings against monopoly control over communications technologies.  
Perhaps because the DARPA skunk works invested heavily in many different directions (and 
many of them ultimately not bearing fruit), and used the brain power of many researchers at an array of 21 
institutions, they themselves garnered the power of decentralization (which is usually affiliated with a 
marketplace), albeit in narrower more disciplined form. Similarly, because the commercial Internet relied 
on strict protocols and standards-setting bodies, they in effect demonstrated the discipline seen more 
typically in centrally funded efforts.  
While the government-based approach to innovation and the market-oriented approach each have 
their strengths and challenges, in the case of the Internet, these two systems came together in a unique, 
phased, and ultimately complementary way. The accumulated knowledge enabled the creation of value in 
myriad numbers of applications that continue to shape the world around us all. 
 
[H1] References 
Abbate, Janet (1999), Inventing the Internet, MIT Press; Cambridge, MA.  
Allen, Robert C. (1983), “Collective Invention,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations, 4(1), 
pp. 1-24.  
Banks, Michael A., (2008), On the Way to the Web: The Secret History of the Internet and its Founders, 
Apress; Berkeley, CA. 
Berners-Lee, Tim, with Mark Fischetti (1999), Weaving the Web, The Original Design and Ultimate 
Destiny of the World Wide Web by Its Inventor, Harper Collins; New York. 
Bradner, Scott (1999), “The Internet Engineering Task Force,” in Open Sources: Voices from the Open 
Source Revolution, eds. C. DiBona, S. Ockman, and M. Stone, Sebastapol, CA; O’Reilly Media Inc. 
Bresnahan, Timothy, and Shane Greenstein (1997), "Technical Progress and Co-Invention in Computing 
and in the Use of Computers." Brookings Papers on Economics Activity: Microeconomics, Pp. 1-78. 
Brock, Gerald, 1975, “Competition, Standards and Self-Regulation in the Computer Industry,” in 
Regulating the Product: Quality and Variety. Richard Caves and Marc Roberts (eds), Ballinger 
Publishing Company; Cambridge, MA.  
Clark, David (2008). Personal communication between David Clark and the author, September 26. 
Crocker, David (2008a), “A Personal View: The Impact of email work done at the RAND in the mid-
1970s,” Mimeo, http://www.bbiw.net/articles/rand-email.pdf , downloaded, August, 2008. 
Crocker, David (2008b). Personal communication between David Crocker and the author, August 7. 
Crocker, Steven D. (1987) “The Origins of RFCs,” in RFC 1000 - Request For Comments Reference 
Guide, compiled by J. Reynolds and J. Postel, ISI, August, http://rfc.sunsite.dk/rfc/rfc1000.html, accessed 
August 5, 2009. 
Forman, Chris, Avi Goldfarb, and Shane Greenstein 2003a “The geographic dispersion of commercial 
Internet use.” In Rethinking Rights and Regulations: Institutional Responses to New Communication 
Technologies, eds. Steve Wildman and Lorrie Cranor, 113-45. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
——. 2003b, “Which industries use the Internet?” In Organizing the New Industrial Economy, ed. 
Michael Baye, 47-72. Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
Frazier, Karen (1995), Building the NSFNet: A Partnership in High Speed Networking, 
ftp://nic.merit.edu/nsfnet/final.report/.index.html, downloaded, August, 2009. 
 
Gerstner, Louis, V. Jr., 2002, Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance? Inside IBM’s Historic Turnaround. 
HarperBusiness; New York.  
 
Goldfarb, Avi (2004), “Concentration in Advertising Supported On-line Markets: An Empirical 
Approach,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 13 (6), 581-594. 
Goldstein, Fred (2005), The Great Telecom Meltdown, Artech House; Boston. 22 
Greenstein, Shane (2008a), “"Economic Experiments and Industry Know-how in Internet Access 
Markets," in (eds) Adam Jaffe, Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, Innovation, Policy and the Economy, Volume 
8, MIT Press. 
 
Greenstein, Shane (2008b), “Innovation and the Evolution of Market Structure for Internet Acces in the 
United States,” in in (eds) William Aspray and Paul E. Ceruzzi (2007), The Internet and American 
Business, MIT Press; Cambridge, MA. Pp 47 – 104. 
Greenstein, Shane (2009a), “The Emergence of the Internet: Collective Invention and Wild Ducks,” 
Industrial and Corporate Change.  
Greenstein, Shane (2009b), “Open platform Development and the Commercial Internet.” In (Ed) 
Annabelle Gawer, Platforms, Innovation and Competition, Edward Elgar; Northampton, MA. Pp, 219-
250. 
Greenstein, Shane (2009c), “Glimmers and Signs of Innovative Health in the Commercial Internet,” 
Journal of Telecommunication and High Technology Law. Pp. 25 – 78. 
Greenstein, Shane, and Ryan McDevitt (2009), “The Broadband Bonus: Accounting for Broadband’s 
Impact on US GDP,” NBER Working paper 14758 
Hanson, Ward (2008), “Discovering a Role Online: Brick-and-Mortar Retailers and the Internet,” in (eds) 
William Aspray and Paul E. Ceruzzi (2007), The Internet and American Business, MIT Press; Cambridge, 
MA. Pp. 233 – 258 
Hicks, John. 1935. “Annual Survey of Economic Theory. The Theory of Monopoly,” Econometrica, V3 
(1), pp. 1-20. 
Hirsch, David, and Brent Goldfarb (2008), “Small Idea, Big Ideas, Bad Ideas, Good Ideas: Get Big Fast 
and Dot Com Venture Creation,” in (eds) William Aspray and Paul E. Ceruzzi (2007), The Internet and 
American Business, MIT Press; Cambridge, MA. Pp. 233 – 258 
Leiner, Barry, Vinton Cerf, David Clark, Robert Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel Lynch, Jon Postel, 
Larry Roberts, Stephen Wolff, (2003), A Brief History of the Internet, Version 3.32, Last revised, 10 
December, 2003. http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml , downloaded August, 2009. 
Mandelbaum, R., and P.A. Mandelbaum (1992), “The Strategic Future of Mid-Level Networks,” in 
Kahin, Brian, Building Information Infrastructure, Issues in the Development of the National Research 
and Education Network, McGraw-Hill Primis, Cambridge, MA.  
Maney, Kevin (2003), Thomas Watson Sr. and the Making of IBM, John Wiley and sons; Hoboken, NJ.  
Meyer, Peter (2003), “Episodes of Collective Invention,” US Bureau of Labor Statistics Working Paper 
No. 368. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=466880, downloaded August, 2008. 
Norberg, Arthur, Judy O’Neill, and Kerry Freedman (1996), Transforming Computer Technology, 
Information Processing for the Pentagon, 1962-1986, Johns Hopkins University Press; Baltimore, MD.  
Partridge, Craig (2008), “The Technical Development of Internet Email,” Annuls of the History of the 
Computing.  
Rich, Ben R, and Leo Janus (1994), Skunk Works; A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed, Back 
Bay Books; Boston, MA. 
Roland, Alex, and Philip Shiman, (2002), Strategic Computing: DARPA and the Quest for Machine 
Intelligence 1983 – 1993. MIT Press; Cambridge, MA. 
Rosenberg, Nathan (1977), “The Direction of Technological Change: Inducement Mechanisms and 
Focusing Devices,” In Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, Cambridge Press. 
Rosenberg, Nathan (1994), “Economic Experiments,” in Inside the Black Box, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.  
Segaller, Stephen (1998) Nerds: A Brief History of the Internet, TV Books LLC; New York.  23 
Shah, Rajiv C., and Jay P. Kesan, (2001), “Fool us Once, Shame on you – Fool us Twice, Shame on us: 
What we Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name 
System,” Washington University Law Quarterly, 79, pp 89 – 220.  
Stern, Scott (2005), “Economic Experiments: The Role of Entrepreneurship in Economic Prosperity,” in 
Understanding Entrepreneurship: A Research and Policy Report. Kaufman Foundation. 
http://research.kauffman.org/cwp/ShowProperty/web/CacheRepository/Documents/  
Research__Policy_Singles.pdf , downloaded, August, 2008.  
Waldrop, Mitchell (2001), The Dream Machine: J.C.R. Licklider and the Revolution that Made 
Computing Personal, Penguin Books; New York. 
West, Joel, and Siobhan O’Mahoney, (2008), “The role of Participation Architecture in Growing Open 
Source Communities,” Industry and Innovation, 15 (2), April, pp. 145-168. 
Wiggins, Richard (2000), “Al Gore and the Creation of the Internet,” First Monday, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_10/wiggins/ , downloaded, August, 2008. 